form a "partnership" with the Department of Justice to "enga resolve they fought the cold war" (National Institute of Just
The military and police comprise the state's primary use-ofof its coercive power (Bittner 1970; Enloe 1980; Kraska 1994;  and operational alliance between these two entities in han usually is associated with repressive governments. Although su associated with countries like the United States, reacting to ce ring the distinction between military and police may be a ke United States. With the threat of communism no longer a nat become a more inviting target for state activity, both internat Perhaps the most striking feature of the modem epoch is the hom coercion. Armed forces, police forces, paramilitary forces around type of military technology.... With the help of advisors and train patterns of operations, methods of recruitment also bear a global r history, soldiers and policeman from different societies have more the societies from which they come (Kothari et al. 1988:22; see als These developments signal not only a strengthening of th complex" (CJIC) (Christie 1994; Quinney 1975) , but a growing CJIC and the military-industrial complex in the post-cold war has escaped the scrutiny of most criminological researchers, a s may be the movement not just toward the police-ization of th militarization of civilian law enforcement in the form of poli Ignoring Police/Military Connections Police history, with its emphasis on the night-watchmen over how civilian police often formed out of militia groups a versely, out of an acute fear of military control (Brewer et al Manning 1977; Weisenhorn 1995) . Policing literature rarely e nections except when lamenting the poor decision made by po the traditional paramilitary police model (Angell 1971 ; Skolni that the police could be anything but paramilitary denies the -historically, politically and sociologically -between the pol Enloe 1980) . Austin Turk (1982:21) makes clear this inherent formation of civilian police forces in emerging states:
As military dominance and jurisdiction are achieved in emerging g date their position by instituting a system in which internal contr of policing instead of the more costly, more overt, and less efficie Scant attention has been paid, thus, to the emerging overl tary functions in the post-Cold War era (Kraska 1993) . In the demics have fixated on the professed turn toward community While transfixed on the "velvet glove," few have inquired into ous strengthening of the "iron-fist" as a type of "backstage"
Crime and Social Justice 1983) . Despite the overtly militaristic nature of U.S. police paramilitary units (PPUs), and their continued growth since the early 1970s, little academic research or discussion examines these units.1
Underlying the inattention paid to PPUs might be the assumption that they are sociologically and politically insignificant. Initially these units constituted a small portion of police efforts and were limited to large urban police departments. The constructed and publicly understood role of PPUs was confined to rare situations involving hostages, terrorism, or the "maniac sniper." Despite the camouflage of these common assumptions, there have been recent unmistakable signs of intensifying military culture in police departments. Although these units are highly secretive about their operations,2 obvious expressions of militarism are found throughout contemporary policing in the form of changing uniforms, weaponry, language, training, and tactics (Kraska 1996) .
Manning (1995) insightfully criticized police research and scholarship for its growing apolitical orientation as it preoccupies itself with concerns of bureaucratic efficiency. An apolitical gaze not only accounts for overlooking these units, but also for not labeling them with what might be misinterpreted as a politically charged tag -"police paramilitary unit."
It is important to demonstrate, therefore, that these units differ markedly from "cop on the beat" policing and differ little from other internationally recognized PPUs in Britain (Special Patrol Groups), Italy (the Carabinieri), Germany (the Grenz Schutz Gruppe 9), France (the Gendarmerie National) or the federal police paramilitary teams in the United States (FBI, DEA, and BATF).
Distinguishing Characteristics of PPUs
As opposed to traditional police, paramilitary units can be distinguished in the following ways. PPUs are equipped with an array of militaristic equipment and technology. They often refer to themselves in military jargon as the "heavy weapons units," implying that what distinguishes them from regular police is the power and number of their weapons. The weapon most popular among these units is the Heckler and Koch MP5 submachine gun; its notoriety originates from elite military "special operations" teams, such as the "Navy Seals." The MP5's direct connection to elite military teams, its imposing futuristic style, an aggressive marketing and training program conducted by the Heckler and Koch corporation, and a host of hi-tech accessories such as laser sights and sound suppressers, all solidify this weapon's central place in police paramilitary subculture (Kraska 1996) . Other weapons include tactical, semi-automatic shotguns, M16s, sniper rifles, and automatic shotguns referred to as "street-sweepers."
PPUs have an array of "less-than-lethal" technology for conducting "dynamic entries"
(e.g., serving a search warrant). These include percussion grenades (explosive devices designed to disorient residents), stinger grenades (similar devices containing rubber pellets), CS and OC gas grenades (tear gas), and shotgun launched bean-bag systems (nylon bags of lead shot). "Dynamic entries" require apparatuses for opening doors, including battering rams, hydraulic door-jamb spreaders, and C4 explosives. Some PPUs purchase and incorporate a range of "fortified tactical vehicles," including military armored personnel carriers and specially equipped "tactical cruisers."
1. Stevens and MacKenna (1988) A PPU's organizational structure is modeled after military and erations teams in that they operate and train collectively under m and discipline (Jefferson 1990 ). These teams wear black or urban uniforms (BDUs)," lace-up combat boots, full body armor, Kevlar goggles with "ninja" style hoods. Team members place a high pre and view themselves as "elite" officers, a view supported and pro ment (Kraska and Paulsen 1996) .
Traditionally, PPU work differed significantly from routine po units formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s to respond to civil suspects, and hostage situations. Today, it is all but impossible to d their work, except that it tends to be what each department defin activities are generally defined as those situations that require a trained to be use-force-specialists. These squads have an intens either the threatened or the actual use of collective force.3
Despite these distinguishing characteristics, PPUs could indeed be considered inconsequential and perhaps functional if they handled only the narrowly defined terrorist or barricaded suspect situations, were housed in the largest departments under tight control, and had little impact on the operations and culture of their departments. However, the authors' ethnographic studies revealed a different set of circumstances (Kraska 1996; Kraska and Paulsen 1996) , raising numerous research questions amenable to a national police survey.
As elaborated in the conclusion, the findings in this research have theoretical importance, despite their descriptive nature. For example, some police scholars argue that we are witnessing the demise of the coercive dimension of policing in "high modern" times (Reiss 1993) .4 A backstage trend toward the militarization of the police has important theoretical implications in a time when most academic discourse centers on "democratic" developments in policing (i.e., community policing). The conclusion explores the irony in this incongruity, 3. There is some confusion and controversy over Jefferson's (1990) use of the descriptor "paramilitary" in discussing police units and activities in the United Kingdom. Waddington (1993) charges Jefferson with an inexact "subjective" definition, while Hills (1995) so narrowly defines "paramilitarism" that paramilitary police activity only occurs when the police operate under the direct control of the actual military itself. At the risk of simplifying a complex debate, it seems to us that one must distinguish between indices of paramilitarism that contribute to labeling police units and their activities as "paramilitaristic," and those necessary factors that must be evident. In identifying a police unit and their activities as paramilitary, three necessary factors include: 1) the unit must be state-sanctioned, operating under legitimate state authority (we would exclude common "thuggery" exercised by a civilian paramilitary unit); 2) they must be trained and operate as a military special teams unit, such as the Navy Seals, with a strict command structure and discipline (or the pretense therof); and 3) they must have at the core and forefront of their function to threaten or use force collectively, instantaneously, and not necessarily as an option of last resort (e.g., conducting a no-knock drug raid). TWo contributing factors -military appearance and military weponry -are critical in distinguishing paramilitary policing from standard policing, but they are not always necessary. For instance, many PPUs dress almost identical to military special operations teams. However, just as Navy Seals can dress-down into less militaristic or even plainclothes and still operate as a paramilitary unit, so can police paramilitary unites when conducting activities as "tacticalpatrol." 4. Chevigny (1995:263) provides evidence that today's police rely less on the use of force: "physical torture has been largely eliminated, and the use of deadly force has been greatly reduced over the last generation." A reduction in deadly force does not necessarily indicate, however, a reduction in police use of violence. Clearly, a more accurate indicator of whether the police are more or less often engaging in force with the intention of death would be the rate at which police fired shots at another person. These data are more difficult to access. Geller and Scott (1992) report on these data for selected police agencies, finding that the rate at which police have discharged their weapons at people actually has increased in several departments during the late 1980s and early 1990s -coinciding with concerted police efforts in the drug war. With regards to PPUs and the use of deadly force, most highly trained and experienced PPUs have as a working credo "not to kill or be killed." This credo, as well as liability issues, probably explains the considerable interest in "less-than-lethal" technologies among PPUs. Expanding police use of force options is similar to correctional net-widening. Less-than-lethal technologies could reduce police use of deadly force, yet also expand the range of force options available to the police, and the situations in which these options are constructed as appropriate.
not by emphasizing the seeming contradiction between the militarization of police and com munity policing but, instead, by stressing the interconnections and possible symbiotic relationship between these two developments.
Methodology
We constructed a 40-item survey (98 variables) to examine the growth and normalization of military tactics and ideology among and within United States law enforcement agen cies. The instrument sought basic demographic information on the responding polic agencies, and included an option for respondents to list their identity and phone number. It also sought both descriptive and longitudinal data on the formation, prevalence, uses, and activities of PPUs as they relate to the U.S. military. Finally, we solicited attitudinal informa tion regarding the respondents' rationales for using PPUs.
Our sampling frame was all United States law enforcement agencies, excluding federal agencies, servicing jurisdictions of 50,000 or more citizens and employing at least 100 sworn officers. This list yielded a population of 690 law enforcement agencies across the states, representing all the various political subdivisions of state and local government. Because w could not determine whether four agencies identified in our sampling frame existed, they were excluded from the mailing.
An initial mailing of the survey was sent to the entire population of police agencies in January, 1996 . This mailing included a letter of introduction, along with a copy of the surve instrument. Because of the secretive and suspicious character of police agencies (Manning 1978; Skolnick 1966; Westley 1956 ) and the difficulty in researching highly sensitive topic associated with policing (Kraska and Kappeler 1995) , the introductory letter was written on recognized sponsor's letterhead. This letter was signed by the principal researcher (first author) as well as the director of the professional organization that agreed to sponsor the re search. It also noted the researchers' university affiliation.5 The language used in the survey encouraged respondents to recognize the study as administratively oriented. This orientation, coupled with the authors' familiarity with PPU rhetoric and the promise of confidential ity and anonymity, likely provided a level of occupational comfort to the respondents.
Within four weeks, the first mailing yielded 413 responses, a 61 percent response rate. After approximately five weeks, a second wave of surveys was mailed to the remaining 281 non-respondents. The second mailing stressed the high level of participation among other law enforcement agencies and it urged cooperation from those departments without a PPU After approximately 6 weeks, this follow-up mailing yielded an additional 135 responses for a total response rate of 79 percent.
The researchers selected 81 of the respondents that provided identification and telephone information for unstructured follow-up phone interviews. Forty agencies that used their PPU for proactive patrol work were selected at random; the remainder were called to have police officials elaborate on their responses. Each phone interview began with an introduction and a brief verification of the data provided on the written survey. We then explored the more sensitive and controversial aspects of PPUs. Interviews lasted between five minutes and one hour -the majority about 20 minutes.
5. Sponsorship was limited to the use of the association's letterhead. The association did not provide any resources nor did it have any input into the project beyond its initial approval. Without the endorsement of a recognized law enforcement organization, the response rate would likely have been significantly lower.
Escalating and Normalizing PPUs
Of the 548 departments responding, 89.4 percent had a police paramilitary unit. Over 20 percent of those departments without a unit said they were "planning on establishing one in the next few years." Although most departments formed their units in the 1970s, the percentage of police departments with PPUs has grown steadily (see Figure 1) . In 1982, about 59 percent of the police departments surveyed had a PPU. By 1990, this figure had increased to 78 percent, and by 1995 it reached 89 percent. The bulk of the newer units were from smaller municipalities and state police agencies.6 1960 1962 1964 196 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1961 1963 1%5 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 Year a Yearly Frequency 0 Cumulative Growth
Of course an increase in the number of PPUs, although an important indication of polic militarization, means little without examining longitudinally the activities of these paramil tary units. Given the traditional role of PPUs, we might expect only a limited number of "deployments" in cases of barricaded suspects or civil demonstrations. Figure 2 reports on the mean "call-outs" -all emergency or high-risk deployments of the PPUs -for each of the years between 1980 and 1995. This graph depicts two sets of call-out data. The fir includes all departments which provided call-out data for any of the years between 1980-1995 (marked as "total"). The second includes only those departments that had PPUs befor 1980, and that provided complete data for all the years 1980-1995 (marked as "compl").
Regarding the "total" data set, between 1980-1983 the mean number of call-outs was fairly constant and minimal, with about 13 call-outs on average per year, or approximatel one PPU deployment per month. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year 0 Avg call-outs (total) * Avg call-outs (compl) departments that have had PPUs since 1980 (marked as "compl"), and that provide plete data from 1980-1995 (n=193), we find that the rise in paramilitary police ac even more pronounced -a 538 percent increase. This enormous growth in PPU activity documents an unprecedented yet little phenomenon in U.S. policing -a dramatic increase in paramilitary policing activit from one call-out per month to four or five may only indicate a dramatic increa number of traditional PPU activities rather than normalization of these units into mainstream policing. Although we could not expect departments to provide data on the types of call-outs for every year, we did ask them for 1995 data on "barricaded persons," "hostage situations," "terrorist activity," "dangerous warrants," "civil disturbances," and "other activities." Of the total number of call-outs (n=25,201), civil disturbances accounted for 1.3 percent (n=338), terrorist incidents .09 percent (n=23), hostage situations 3.6 percent (n=913), and barricaded persons 13.4 percent (n=3,880). Respondents reported that the majority of call-outs were to conduct what the police call "high risk warrant work," mostly "drug raids." Warrant work accounted for 75.9 percent (n=19,125) of all paramilitary activity in 1995.
As shown in Figure 3 , police using PPUs "proactively" for high-risk warrant work surged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Phone interviews provided the researchers with insights into the significance of this phenomenon. Both large and small departments, with the exception of those few PPUs that have remained true to their original purpose (about 10 percent), gave essentially the same account. The drug war of the late 1980s and early 1990s required the servicing of an unprecedented number of search warrants and a lesser number of arrest warrants. Rather than reactively responding to traditional crimes such as robbery, the police can go into the population and proactively produce cases against an almost limitless number of drug users and low-level dealers (Barnett 1987 ) -hence, the dramatic increase in "callouts." Most traditionally reaction-oriented PPUs enthusiastically accepted the new function of executing large numbers of warrants; many PPUs now conduct between 200-700 warrants/drug raids a year.
According to our respondents, "warrant work" consists almost exclusively of what police call "no-knock entries." Generally a search warrant is obtained through either a police informant or a tip from a neighbor. After securing a warrant, the paramilitary unit conducts a 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 Year U Yearly Frequency * Cumulative Growth "dynamic entry," generally on a private residence. Some departments claimed that these "drug raids" do not even require a warrant if the police have reason to believe that waiting for a warrant would endanger lives or lead to the destruction of evidence.7 As one commander described these operations, "our unit storms the residence with a full display of weaponry so we can get the drugs before they're flushed."8 Some of the PPU commanders stressed that this type of proactive policing -instigated not by an existing high-risk situation but one generated by the police themselves -is highly dangerous for both PPU members and citizens.
7. The PPU in Chapel Hill, North Carolina conducted a crack-raid of an entire block in an African-American neighborhood. The raid, termed "Operation Redi-Rock," resulted in the detention and search of up to 100 people, all of whom were African-American (whites were allowed to leave the area). No one was ever prosecuted for a crime (Barnett v. Karpinos 1995) .
8. According to our interviews the majority of warrants served by PPUs are executed as dynamic, no-knock entries. While constitutional provisions of the Fourth Amendment are intended to constrain and limit the situations and methods used in police searches, courts have endorsed the use of PPUs to serve routine search and arrest warrants (Kappeler 1993) . Courts are more than willing to issue "no-knock if necessary" warrants, particularly in cases characterized as drug-related (Moss v. City of Colorado Springs, 1989; King v. Marmon, 1992) . The ease with which police can obtain no-knock warrants and the almost unlimited "reasonable" justifications for deviating from the knock and announce requirement (Collier v. Locicero, 1993) partly account for increases in dynamic no-knock entries. The "if necessary" clause of the no-knock warrant has also given the police greater autonomy in how these raids are conducted. It is not uncommon for warrants to be issued based on fictitious police informants (Streetman v. Jordan, 1990; Hevey v. Estes, 1995) , false or misleading information provided by police (Williams v. City of Detroit, 1994), or an officer's sole testimony concerning the detection of drug orders (U.S. v. Riveria, 1979) . The growing list of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement provides the police with near unlimited discretion in making the decision of whether to conduct a raid. Police now use the "administrative search exception" to the warrant requirement to conduct warrantless raids (Hamilton v. Lokuta, 1992) . These raids often target locations deemed by the police to be community problems such as exotic dance halls, "drug-houses," private birthing clinics, or people the police previously, and often unsuccessfully investigated (Hummel-Toner v. Strope, 1994; Hamilton v. Lokita, 1992; Turner v. Upton County, Texas, 1990) .
A police official from a large southwestern police department explained: "In the early 90s we conducted 500 drug raids a year; things got way too dangerous and we cut way back." In this department, a team of ex-PPU members took over the warrant work after forming their own narcotics PPU. A specific incident led to this captain's negative view of drug raids:
We did a crack-raid and got in a massive shoot-out in an apartment building. Shots were fired and we riddled a wall with bullets. An MP5 round will go through walls. When we went into the next apartment where the bullets were penetrating, we found a baby crib full of holes; thank god those people weren't home.
The interviewees also stressed that confiscating guns and money in these drug raids is as important as confiscating drugs. Several commanders noted how confiscated assets sometimes fund the purchase of new paramilitary equipment. It is critical to recognize, therefore, that doing "warrant work" is not just the perfunctory serving of a warrant subsequent to an in-depth investigation. Rather, it has become a proactive tool through which the police gather evidence and crudely conduct an investigation into suspected illegal activity. Marx (1988) has drawn considerable attention to police undercover narcotics investigations in the war on drugs. Few have noted this proactive policing tactic, perhaps more prevalent than undercover work, of PPUs conducting military-style investigatory drug raids on private residences.
These data demonstrate movement toward the normalization of paramilitary police groups. Another change that further substantiates the militarization of policing is patrol work. A recent article in a popular police magazine indicates just such a phenomenon. Police in Fresno, California pursue the goal of "proactive policing" by responding to what the article termed their inner-city "war zone" with a 40-man SWAT team, equipped with full military garb and weaponry. The objective of this full-time patrol-unit is to "suppress" the gang, drug, and crime problems. The article claims great success for this approach and sees it as an inevitable trend:
The general consensus has been that SWAT teams working in a proactive patrol-type setting does work. Police officers working in patrol vehicles, dressed in urban tactical gear and armed with auto matic weapons are here -and they're here to stay (Smith 1995:82 ; emphasis added).
Although we assumed the Fresno police department was an aberration, we still asked in the survey, "Is your department using the tactical operations unit as a proactive patrol unit t aid high crime areas?" Out of the 487 departments responding to this question, more than 20 percent (n= 107) responded affirmatively. Using a PPU for patrol work was not limited to large metropolitan cities. Forty-seven percent (n=50) of the departments using their PPU fo proactive patrol work served populations between 50,000 and 250,000; 20 percent (n=21 served populations between 50,000 and 100,000. Figure 4 illustrates the year when each department began using its PPU for proactive patrol work. The graph shows a precipitous rise in normalizing paramilitary teams into patro work. Since 1982, there has been a 292 percent increase (from 24 to 94) in the number of departments using PPUs for proactive patrol. Just since 1989, the number of departments deploying PPUs in this manner has doubled. As an indication of this trend continuing, 61 percent of the respondents agreed that: "Tactical Operations Units should be deployed to patrol high crime areas."
As Figure 4 shows, a few departments have used PPUs as patrol units since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Early PPUs sometimes engaged in "saturation patrol" of high crime areas, often in plain-clothes and unmarked cars. The question we needed answered, and one that was too threatening to ask in the survey itself, was whether the PPU patrolled in full "tactica gear" like the Fresno police department. 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1962 196%4 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 Year M Yearly Frequency 0 Cumulative Growth Forty departments that answered affirmatively to the patrol question were randoml selected for telephone interviews. We asked about their garb, weaponry, and tactics. Differ ent departments employ a variety of methods, ranging from full military-like, aggressive trol as found in Fresno (n=21), to patrol officers not dressed in full tactical gear but "slun with MP5s" (n=9), to PPU members in plain-clothes and standard police revolvers, carryin their full tactical gear and weaponry in car trunks (n=10). Some departments rotated the approaches depending on circumstances. One highly acclaimed community policing depar ment described their latest approach:
We're into saturation patrols in hot spots. We do a lot of our work with the SWAT unit because w have bigger guns. We send out two, two-to-four-men cars, we look for minor violations and jump-outs, either on people on the street or automobiles. After we jump-out the second car provides periphery cover with an ostentatious display of weaponry. We're sending a clear message: if t shootings don't stop, we'll shoot someone [emphasis added].
Another commander described how his "progressive" police chief purchased a "SWAT bus" so that 30 tactical officers in full military gear could be deployed to "hot spots" throug out the city. "They geared up every night -30 officers every night for four months." O mid-west police department that services a community of 75,000 people patrols in full-tact cal gear using a military armored personnel carrier (termed a "peace-keeper") as their tran port vehicle. The PPU commander described their approach as targeting: suspicious vehicles and people. We stop anything that moves. We'll sometimes even surround suspicious homes and bring out the MP5s. We usually don't have any problems with crack-hea cooperating."9 Two departments admitted they funded these very expensive operations with federal moni allocated for community policing programs -either by using these funds for overtime pay 9. One PPU commander was overt about the intersection of militarism and racial bias in their paramilitary pat work when he stated: "When the soldiers ride in you should see those blacks scatter." It is critical to note that several of the PPU others displeased, to hear that other departm commander stressed that the practice not onl serves but, "operationally stupid. I realize som off -intimidation with no purpose." Another did admit that his PPU members repeatedly r he put it, "I can't blame them, we're a very eli
The elite self-perception and status granted t military special operations groups have in m Although the shared culture between the poli supported the notion that these two use-of-for operationally. However, field research uncover intimately involved in police special operation training" with paramilitary police officers (K into the training activities of PPUs and its con ing" may seem to be a purely technical exercise subculture (Gibson 1994) . Training constructs group's work, the importance of feeling and th is doing "real" police work (see Kappeler et. al playing out "warrior fantasies" (Gibson 1994 ; K volves around PPU training in which units from other countries, join together in annual traini prevalent; our survey found that 63 percent of With regard to PPU's material connection wit asked first to identify the sources of training w riod of their PPU. As seen in Table 1, almost 46 with special operations experience in the milit tive-duty military experts in special operation sources that currently provide training for the cent of the departments received training from ence in the military," and almost 46 percent " special operations."
Because 23 of the respondents wrote in the with either "Navy Seals" or "Army Rangers," w the extent and nature of this training. One re We've had special forces folks who have come right out of the jun America. These guys get into the real shit. All branches of military servi training to law enforcement. U.S. Marshalls act as liaisons between the po the training -our go-between. They have an arrangement with the mili task force 6].... I just received a piece of paper from a four-star general about the type of training we're getting. We've had teams of Navy Seals here and teach us everything. We just have to use our judgment and exc "at this point we bring in the mortars and blow the place up."
During the late 1980s drug war, the Bush administration establis of Defense "Joint Task Forces" responsible for coordinating drug int borders, abroad, and domestically (Kraska 1993) . This arrangem overlap and cooperation between the military and civilian police for ing the armed forces' elite special operations teams cross-train with Implications and Discussion: Emerging Trends in Formal Social
Control
Our research found a sharp rise in the number of police paramilitary units, a rapid expansion in their activities, the normalization of paramilitary units into mainstream polic work, and a close ideological and material connection between PPUs and the U.S. armed forces. These findings provide compelling evidence of a national trend toward the militarization of U.S. civilian police forces and, in turn, the militarization of corresponding social problems handled by the police.l0 The data also reveal a continuing upward trend in proactive paramilitary policing activities. Before attempting to make sense of these phenomena in a broader context, it is important to review some policy-specific dangers associated with the rise and normalization of paramilitary policing.
First, the militarism inherent in PPUs escalates to new heights the cynical view that the most expedient route to solving social problems is through military-style force, weaponry, and technology. Second, the heightened ethos of militarism in these "elite" police units is potentially infectious for the police institution; many police departments have created specialized PPUs for patrol, narcotics, and gang "suppression." According to some commanders, PPUs are also the testing ground for incorporating tactical equipment, such as percussion grenades, into mainstream policing. Third, despite the belief among tactical officers that PPUs enhance officer and citizen safety, numerous incidents and common sense raise questions about the dangerousness of these units to officers and citizens." Contemporary PPUs do not just react to pre-existing emergencies that might require highly trained teams of police officers. Instead, most PPUs proactively seek out and even manufacture highly dangerous situations. Finally, paramilitary policing is not just an urban "inner-city" phenomenon. These units target what the police define as high crime or disorderly areas, which most often are poor neighborhoods, whatever the city's size.
A comfortable and certainly not illogical interpretation of this research is that contemporary policing is experiencing two parallel developments: a well-publicized movement toward community accountability, responsiveness, and problem-solving, and another backstage development toward militarization. This research, therefore, might be set aside as only uncovering a dark side of contemporary policing. The extent to which PPUs have been normalized into mainstream policing indicates otherwise. A police commander's description of his PPUs role in community policing accentuates this observation:
We conduct a lot of saturation patrol. We do "terry stops" and "aggressive" field interviews. These tactics are successful as long as the pressure stays on relentlessly. The key to our success is that we're an elite crime fighting team that's not bogged down in the regular bureaucracy. We focus on "quality of life" issues like illegal parking, loud music, bums, neighbor troubles. We have the freedom to stay in a hot area and clean it up -particularly gangs. Our tactical enforcement team works nicely with our department's emphasis on community policing [emphasis added].
This commander views community policing and militarized policing as linked symbiotically. Indeed, 63 percent of the respondents in this survey agreed that PPUs "play an important role in community policing strategies." Contemporary police reformers have asked the police to join together in problem-solving teams, to design ways to take control of the streets, to take ownership of neighborhoods, to actively and visibly create a climate of order, and to improve communities' quality of life (Bayley 1994; Goldstein 1990; Hoover 1996; Sherman 1995; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990; Wilson 1983 Wilson , 1995 Worden 1996) . Note how the PPU commander quoted above interpreted and implemented such "progressive" recommendations. Another self-proclaimed community policing chief provides a similar, although more blunt interpretation:
It's going to come to the point that the only people that are going to be able to deal with these problems are highly trained tactical teams with proper equipment to go into a neighborhood and clear the neighborhood and hold it; allowing community policing and problem oriented policing officers to come in and start turning the neighborhood around.
Both interpretations of community and problem-oriented policing are consistent with a historically embedded police ideology and practice. Indeed, police departments throughout the United States are reverting, with the support of reform-minded police academicians, to highly aggressive tactics, many centering on precisely the paramilitary approach documented in this research (Cordner 1996; Hoover 1996; Hoover and Caeti 1994; Lacayo 1996; Sherman 1992 Sherman , 1994 Sherman , 1995 Sviridoff and Hillsman 1996; Worden 1996; Worden et.al 1994) .12 Three elements, then, are ideologically and pragmatically intertwined in an emerging form of policing: 1) the "war on crime and drugs" metaphor; 2) community and problem-oriented policing ideology; and, 3) the escalation and normalization of PPU activities.
Interestingly, the theoretical mortar troweled retroactively between these three elements is "routine activities theory" or what Sherman et al. (1989) calls a "criminology of place." Since the 1950s law enforcement has engaged in "pin-map" policing -conducting "saturation patrol" in those geographical spots with the most crime, or pins. Only recently, however, have we seen the academic and theoretical credentialization of this pin-map approach, along with a more sophisticated scientific discourse promoting the notion that the police need to "target aggregate populations," and social problems and spaces defined as criminogenic "hot-spots."'3 Considering the recent wave of U.S. Department of Justice research 12. The former Police Commissioner of the New York City Police Department is probably the most vocal, and boastful, regarding its recent implementation of their "get tough on crime" approach. He ridiculed "liberal criminologists" who have claimed that aggressive policing cannot reduce crime (Lacayo 1996) . In April 1996, NYPD launched a "3,000 officer offensive" to "crush drug trafficking and the drug business" (Kraus 1996:1) . Referring to the widespread use of narcotics paramilitary police teams and paramilitary patrol units, one reporter noted: "this drug initiative is likely to look something like a military campaign."
13. Notice the similarities to what Feeley and Simon (1992) label the "new penology." Just as the modern U.S. prison apparatus moves toward focusing on controlling aggregate populations instead of individual offenders, so are the monies targeted for police crime reduction programs and the p tough" measures, it should not be surprising that some of the po this "theoretical orientation" includes paramilitary drug raids and the resurrection of these efforts are often governmentally spo academic circles as "scientific experiments" and "problem-sol MacKenzie and Uchida 1994; Sherman and Erez 1995) . Again, it ta ognize how the metaphor of "war" -with its emphasis on occup force, and restoration of territory -coincides naturally with the targeting and taking control, indeed ownership, of politically def populations, and social problems with military-style teams and On a broader level, this research demonstrates the necessity of gaze to include the police institution's larger role, nationally and and maintaining state power, particularly as these processes relat verging trends of the militarization of police and police-ization o Cold War era renders Enloe's (1980:8) admonishment to social, po even more compelling: "the military and police in any state hav mon framework. Police and military analysts too often follow sep blinds them to the mutually dependent relationship the police an any state." The streamlining of these two use-of-force entities taken-for-granted separation between the military and police as governance. C. Wright Mills (1970:246) expressed concern for emerging means of violence -referring to the military-industria tified here, in conjunction with the escalation of the "crime contr may portend an inwardly focused and more subtle "emerging me paramilitarized violence found in a rapidly expanding criminal j with both ideological and material connections to the military-i
